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HEAT EXPANDS ALL THINGS: THE PROLIFERATION 
OF GREENHOUSE GAS REGULATION UNDER THE 
0BAMA ADMINISTRATION 
JONATHAN H. ADLER* 
During his campaign for the White House, Barack Obama 
called for decisive action to address the threat of global climate 
change. Specifically, then-Senator Obama called for reducing, 
by 2050, greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in the United States 
by 80% through the imposition of a "cap-and-trade" regime.1 
He pledged that, as President, legislation to achieve this goal 
would be among his top priorities.2 
Congressional leaders also endorsed decisive action on cli-
mate change. In 2009, the House of Representatives enacted a 
far-reaching climate bill that included a cap-and-trade system 
and endorsed the 80% reduction goaP The Senate refused to 
follow suit, however, and it appears unlikely that a cap-and-
trade bill or other meaningful climate legislation will pass 
Congress in the next two years.4 But the death of cap-and-trade 
does not mean the death of greenhouse gas regulation. 
*Professor of Law and Director, Center for Business Law & Regulation, Case 
Western Reserve University School of Law. Thanks to Daniel Smith for his re-
search assistance. 
1. See The Office of the President-Elect, Agenda: Energy & Environment, CHANGE.GOV, 
http://change.gov/agenda/energy_and_environment_agenda/ Qast visited Mar. 19, 
2011); see also Barack Obama, U.S. Sen., Remarks at Portsmouth, New Hampshire: Real 
Leadership for a Clean Energy Future (Oct. 8, 2007), http://www.barackobama.com/ 
2007/10/08/remarks_of_senator_barack_obam_28.php. 
2. See John M. Broder, Obama Affirms Climate Change Goals, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
19, 2008, http://www .nytimes.com/2008/11/19/us/politics/19climate.html. 
3. The American Clean Energy and Security Act sought to reduce GHG emis-
sions by 3% below 2005 levels by 2012, 17% below 2005 levels by 2020, and 83% 
below 2005 levels by 2050. H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (2009). It is unlikely that this 
level of reductions would have been achieved. See infra notes 135-37 and ac-
companying text. 
4. See Darrell Samuelsohn & Coral Davenport, Democrats Pull Plug on Climate Bz1l, 
POUTICO Guly 22, 2010, 1:01 PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0710/ 
40109.html. 
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Although Congress did not put climate change legislation on 
President Obama' s desk, the Obama Administration still 
moved ahead with various regulatory measures to control 
GHG emissions.5 Using authority under the Clean Air Act and 
other existing environmental statutes, the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency (EPA) and other agencies have been expanding 
existing regulatory programs to cover GHG emissions and ad-
dress climate change concerns.6 Several measures are already in 
place and others are in the regulatory pipeline, although citizen 
suit litigation could produce still more. 
These initiatives will produce a dramatic expansion of fed-
eral environmental controls on private economic activity. 
Taken together, these controls could represent the largest ex-
pansion of federal environmental regulation in decades, and 
yet they have never been explicitly endorsed, let alone author-
ized, by Congress. Worse still, there is little reason to believe 
that these measures will do much to reduce the threats posed 
by global climate change. Extensive GHG regulation will not 
notably mitigate projected warming. 
Federal regulation of GHGs is not entirely the Obama Ad-
ministration's doing. Federal regulatory authority over GHGs 
was facilitated-if not mandated-by the Supreme Court's de-
cision in Massachusetts v. EPA? Yet the Obama Administration 
has not resisted this newfound authority. To the contrary, the 
EPA and other agencies have embraced their opportunity to 
extend regulatory authority into new fields and have rejected 
legislative proposals to cabin their newfound power. 
The extension of federal regulatory authority to control GHG 
emissions w1.der existing stah1tory frameworks is a mistake. 
Such regulation will impose substantial regulatory costs for 
minimal environmental gain. Centralized regulatory authority 
offers little hope of controlling the planetary thermostat. In-
stead, mitigating the threat of anthropogenic climate change 
requires a different approach-one that is not authorized under 
5. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, U.S. CLIMATE ACTION REPORT 2010, at 39 (2010), avail-
able at http://www.state.gov/g/oes/rls/rpts/car5/index.htm ("Since assuming office, 
President Obama has moved quickly to establish new federal policies and measures 
designed to reassert American leadership in solving the global climate challenge."). 
6. See infra Part III. 
7. 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
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existing law and that does not require dramatic expansions of 
the federal regulatory state. 
Part I of this Article explains how the push for GHG regula-
tion is not new. An environmentalist petition filed in 1999 
eventually led to the Supreme Court decision authorizing fed-
eral regulation of GHGs under the Clean Air Act. Part II out-
lines the Obama Administration's use of this authority. The 
Clean Air Act, however, is not the only source of federal regu-
latory authority over GHGs. Part III provides an overview of 
some of the other regulatory initiatives undertaken by the 
Obarna Administration to limit GHG emissions, or otherwise 
address the threat of global climate change. 
The expansion of federal regulation does not guarantee an 
increase in environmental protection. In the case of GHGs, ex-
pansive regulatory action is unlikely to reduce the threat of 
climate change. Rather, as Part IV explains, such efforts are 
likely to be futile in the near to medium term. If policymakers 
wish to reduce the threat of climate change, they need to chart 
an alternative course. Part V explains why the best approach to 
climate change mitigation should focus on technological inno-
vation and diffusion so as to make significant GHG emission 
reductions possible and affordable. 
I. MASSACHUSETTS V. EPA AND TilE 
ROAD TO EPA REGULATION 
Extensive scientific research suggests human activity is hav-
ing a demonstrable effect on the global climate system.8 An-
thropogenic emissions have increased the concentration of 
carbon dioxide and other GHGs in the atmosphere, which has 
8. See William Collins et a!., The Physical Science Behind Climate Change, SCI. 
AM., Aug. 2007, at 68 (noting that the 2007 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) report concluded that it was "very likely" that human activity 
was responsible for most of late twentieth century warming, whereas the 2001 
IPCC report concluded that human responsibility was only "likely"); see also 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE 
PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS 665 (2007) ("Greenhouse gas forcing has very likely 
caused most of the observed global warming over the last 50 years."); NAT'L 
RESEARCH COUNCIL, ADVANCING THE SCIENCE OF CLIMATE CHANGE 27 (2010) 
("Climate change is occurring, is caused largely by human activities, and poses 
significant risks for-and in many cases is already affecting-a broad range of 
human and natural systems."). 
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contributed to a gradual warming of the climate.9 The precise 
nature and degree of the human contribution is unknown, and 
may even be unknowable given the complexity of the global 
climate system.1° Nonetheless, even so-called "skeptics" accept 
that anthropogenic emissions contribute to global warming, 
though they dispute the magnitude of the threat.l1 
The road to federal regulation of GHGs under the Clean Air 
Act began in 1999, when a handful of environmentalist organi-
zations petitioned the EPA to control GHG emissions from new 
motor vehicles under Section 202 of the Act.12 EPA General 
Counsel Jonathan Cannon had recently told a congressional 
committee that he believed the Agency had the authority to 
regulate GHG emissions but had no intent to do so at that time.13 
The petition aimed to force the EPA's hand. According to the 
environmentalist groups, global warming threatened human 
health and welfare, obligating the Agency to act.l4 
9. See Collins et al., supra note 8, at 65 ("Over the past 20 years, evidence that hu-
mans are affecting the climate has accumulated inexorably, and with it has come 
ever greater certainty across the scientific community in the reality of recent climate 
change and the potential for much greater change in the future."). 
10. This uncertainty need not preclude action to mitigate the threat of climate 
change. The case for taking action to address rising atmospheric concentrations 
of greenhouse gases need not be premised upon apocalyptic climate projections. 
See, e.g., ROGER PIELKE, JR., THE CLIMATE FIX: WHAT SCIENTISTS AND 
POLITICIANS WON'T TELL YOU ABOUT GLOBAL WARMING 128-29 (2010); Jona-
than H. Adler, Taking ProperhJ Rights Seriously: The Case of Climate Change, 26 
Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y 296, 307-09 (2009). 
11. See PATRICK J. MICHAELS & ROBERT C. BALLING, JR., CLIMATE OF EXTREMES: 
GLOBAL WARMING SCIENCE THEY DON'T WANT YOU TO KNOW 11-20 (2009); see 
also PATRICK J. MICHAELS & ROBERT C. BALLING, JR., THE SATANIC GASES: 
CLEARING THE AIR ABOUT GLOBAL WARMING (2000); ROY W. SPENCER, CLIMATE 
CONFUSION: HOW GLOBAL WARMING HYSTERIA LEADS TO BAD SCIENCE, 
PANDERING POLITICIANS AND MISGUIDED POLICIES THAT HURT THE POOR 6 
(2008); John R. Christy, The Global Warming Fiasco, in GLOBAL WARMING AND 
OTHER ECO-MYTHS: HOW THE ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT USES FALSE SCIENCE 
TO SCARE US TO DEATH (Ronald Bailey ed., 2002). 
12. See Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 
Fed. Reg. 52,922, 52,922-23 (Sept. 8, 2003) [hereinafter Control of Emissions]. 
The GHGs specifically at issue are: carbon dioxide (C02), methane (CH4), ni-
trous oxide (ND), and hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) Id. at 52,923. 
13. Memorandum from Jonathan Z. Cannon, Gen. Counsel, EPA, to Carol M. 
Browner, Adm'r, EPA 2 (Apr. 10, 1998), http://www.virginialawreview.org/inbrief/ 
2007 /05/21/cannon-memorandum.pdf. 
14. Control of Emissions, supra note 12, at 52, 923. 
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The petition remained unanswered until 2003.15 Neither the 
Clinton nor Bush Administrations was eager to unleash the 
power of the Clean Air Act on GHGs. Tired of waiting, the 
environmentalist petitioners and several northeastern states 
threatened to sue the Agency for its failure to act. In September 
2003, the EPA denied the petition, declaring that it lacked 
statutory authority to regulate GHGs as pollutants under the 
Act, and that even if it had such authority, it would decline to 
exercise it because there were more effective ways of address-
ing the threat posed by global warming.16 The EPA reasoned 
that the Act was written to address conventional air pollutants 
such as particulates and ozone smog, and not globally dis-
persed emissions such as carbon dioxide.17 The Agency further 
concluded that coordinated international efforts made more 
sense than haphazard regulation built on an Act written for a 
different purpose.1s 
The environmentalist and state petitioners were neither con-
vinced by the EPA's analysis nor content to wait for congres-
sional action on global warming. Instead, they filed suit, joined 
by a large number of states and interest groups.19 A three-judge 
panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit split 
15. The EPA requested public comment on the petition in January 2001, see 
Control of Emissions from New and In-use Highway Vehicles and Engines, 66 
Fed. Reg. 7486 (Jan. 23, 2001), but it did not respond to the petition until Sep-
tember 2003. See Control of Emissions, supra note 12. 
16. See Control of Emissions, supra note 12, at 52,925. 
17. I d. at 52,926-27. 
18. ld. at 52,927. 
19. The state petitioners were California, Connecticut, Illinois, Maine, Massachu-
setts, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, and 
Washington. Other government parties were the District of Columbia, American 
Samoa, New York City, and Baltimore. The environmentalist petitioners were the 
Center for Biological Diversity, Center for Food Safety, Conservation Law Founda-
tion, Environmental Advocates, Environmental Defense, Friends of the Earth, 
Greenpeace, International Center for Technology Assessment, National Environ-
mental Trust, Natural Resources Defense Council, Sierra Club, Union of Concerned 
Scientists, and U.S. Public Interest Research Group. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 
U.S. 497, 505 nn.2-4 (2007). Various businesses supported the state and environmen-
talist petitioners, including the Aspen Skiing Corporation, Calpine, and Entergy, as 
did some trade associations and groups representing renewable energy interests. See 
generally Bruce Yandle & Stuart Buck, Bootleggers, Baptists, and the Global Wanning 
Battle, 26 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 177, 208 (2002) (discussing business support for GHG 
emission control policies). 
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three ways, ultimately rejecting the petitioners' claims, teeing 
the case up for the Supreme Court.20 
Massachusetts v. EPA, decided in 2007, is arguably the most 
consequential Supreme Court decision of the past five years. 
Among other things, the Court held, five to four, that the EPA 
had authority to regulate GHGs as air pollutants under the 
Clean Air Act and that the Bush Administration had failed to 
provide an adequate explanation for its refusal to regulate.21 The 
Court concluded that there was no ambiguity in the Act of the 
sort that could trigger Chevron deference and that "greenhouse 
gases fit well within the Clean Air Act's capacious definition of 
'air pollutant."'22 Writing for the majority, Justice John Paul Ste-
vens explained that the Act's "broad language" was designed to 
ensure sufficient "flexibility" so as to ensure that the Clean Air 
Act would not become obsolete.23 He further brushed aside con-
cems that the Act's complex regulatory structure was a poor fit 
for global climate control, even though it had been designed and 
refined to combat localized air pollution problems.24 
Assuming that carbon dioxide and other GHGs constituted 
air pollutants subject to regulation under , the Act, the Bush 
Administration's refusal to regulate was arbitrary and un-
moored from its statutory obligations. In denying the environ-
mentalist and state petition, the EPA did not deny the reality of 
human contributions to global climate change, nor did it mini-
mize the threat. To the contrary, the EPA endorsed President 
Bush's remarks that the United States "must address" the 
threat of climate change and noted other policy initiatives in-
tended to "reduce the risk" of global warming?5 The EPA sim-
ply pursued a "different policy approach" that was a better fit 
for the nature of the problem.21; Trying to use the Clean Air Act 
to regulate global atmospheric concentrations of carbon diox-
ide and other GHGs did not "make sense," according to the 
20. Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50, 53,58 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
21. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 528, 534-35 (2007). 
22. Id. at 532. 
23. Id. 
24. Id. at 532-33. 
25. Control of Emissions, supra note 12, at 52,929-31. The majority in Massa-
chusetts v. EPA took note of the EPA's concessions and "attach[ed] considerable 
significance" to Agency statements that global warming is a problem that must 
be addressed. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 547 U.S. at 526. 
26. Control of Emissions, supra note 12, at 52,929-31. 
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Agency, and would have constituted "an inefficient, piecemeal 
approach" to the problem.27 A better approach, according to 
the EPA, would be to pursue international agreements so as to 
ensure global cooperation on a global concern. 
The EPA was likely correct as a policy matter.28 The United 
States is not capable of reducing, let alone controlling, atmos-
pheric concentrations of GHGs on its own, under the Clean 
Air Act or otherwise. The global atmosphere is a global com-
mons, and it can only be protected through concerted global 
action. Yet the relevant statutory language did not permit the 
EPA to consider broader policy concerns or engage in a rov-
ing inquiry about whether it is desirable to adopt regulatory 
controls on GHGs. It had to exercise its discretion within the 
Act's stah1tory limits.29 
Under the Clean Air Act, the EPA is required to regulate mo-
tor vehicle emissions of any "air pollutant" that in the "judg-
ment" of the Administrator "cause, or contribute to, air pollution 
which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health 
or welfare."30 Therefore, if GHGs are "air pollutants," the only 
question left for the EPA is whether their emissions contribute to 
public endangerment.31 Although the Court did not order the 
EPA to issue an endangerment finding, that result was a fait ac-
27. Id. at 52,931. 
28. See Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., Federal Control of Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 40 
ENVTL. L. 1261, 1323 (2010) ("TI1e CAA is not a tool designed to deal with GHG 
emissions, or more specifically C02."); see also Jason Scott Johnston, Climate 
Change Confusion and the Supreme Court: The Misguided Regulation of Greenhouse 
Gas Emissions Under the Clean Air Act, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 2 (2008); Arnold 
W. Reitze, Jr., Federal Control of Carbon Dioxide Emissions: What Are the Options?, 
36 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 16 (2009). 
29. Massachusetts v. EPA, 547 U.S. at 533 ("[T]he use of the word 'judgment' 
is not a roving license to ignore the statutory text. It is but a direction to exercise 
discretion within defined statutory limits."). 
30. See 42 U.S. C.§ 7521(a)(1) (2006). 
31. Massachusetts v. EPA, 547 U.S. at 533 ("Under the clear terms of the Clean 
Air Act, EPA can avoid taking further action only if it determines that green-
house gases do not contribute to climate change or if it provides some reason-
able explanation as to why it cannot or will not exercise its discretion to 
determine whether they do."). Under the Court's holding, it is possible that the 
EPA could have tried to withhold its judgment, perhaps by explaining that it 
was not going to make or reject an endangerment finding at this time because it 
was devoting resources to other concerns. Yet this would have been a difficult 
position for the Agency to maintain because of repeated public pronouncements 
about the threat of climate change-pronouncements that all but endorsed an 
actual endangerment finding. 
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compli. After years of Agency pronouncements and studies de-
tailing the potential harms of global warming, on top of studies 
by the National Academy of Sciences and other respected au-
thorities, the Agency had little room to claim before the Court 
that global warming was not a threat. After Massachusetts v. 
EPA, the question of whether the EPA would regulate GHGs 
eventually was obviated and replaced only by a question of 
when such regulation would take place.32 
II. ENDANGERMENT AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 
The Obama Administration wasted little time before moving 
ahead with GHG regulation. After a notice-and-comment 
rulemaking, the EPA made a formal finding on December 15, 
2009 that GHG emissions from new motor vehicles caused or 
contributed to air pollution that could be reasonably inter-
preted to endanger public health or welfare.33 This finding was 
the trigger for the regulation of GHG emissions from new mo-
tor vehicles under Section 202 of the Act, and mudt else as 
well. Once a substance is regulated as a pollutant under one 
portion of the Act, other provisions are triggered as well. Still 
other provisions of the Clean Air Act contain virtually identical 
endangerment language, all but ensuring further regulation of 
GHGs tmder the Act once an initial determination of endan-
germent had been made. 
The EPA's endangerment finding will be very difficult to chal-
lenge in court.34 The language of Section 202 is fairly precaution-
ary. The EPA is not required to prove that global warming is 
upon us, let alone that it threatens environmental catastrophe. 
Nor is tl"le Agency required to show that the net effects of climate 
change on human health are negative, or that regulation of GHG 
32. This was also the view of EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson, who main-
tained that the EPA was obligated to regulate GHGs in the wake of Massachu-
setts v. EPA. See Letter from Lisa P. Jackson, Adm'r, EPA, to Sen. Jay Rockefeller 
(Feb. 22, 2010), http://epa.gov/oar/pdfs/lpj_letter.pdf ("As a result of the Court's 
decision, EPA became obligated to treat greenhouse-gas emissions as air pollu-
tion under the Clean Air Act and to engage with the best available science in 
determining whether those emissions endanger Americans' health or welfare."). 
33. Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases 
Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496 (Dec. 15, 2009) 
(final rule). 
34. At the time of this writing, several petitions for review have been filed by 
various states, trade associations, and anti-regulatory organizations. 
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emissions would be worthwhile. Indeed, the Agency is precluded 
from considering costs at this stage. All the EPA must show is that 
it could reasonably anticipate that global warming thxeatens pub-
lic health or "welfare," an expansive term that the Act explicitly 
defines to include effects on climate, "economic values" and "per-
sonal comfort and well-being."35 Reviewing courts will not substi-
hlte their reading of the relevant scientific evidence for that of the 
EPA, so it is also no use arguing that the Agency placed too mucl1. 
weight on one study while discounting another. Thus, even if 
courts were convinced the threat from anthropogenic warming 
was small and that positive effects of a modestly wanner climate 
could outweigh any negative effects, it would not justify over-
huning the EPA's judgment. 
The first immediate consequence of the endangerment finding 
was the EPA's adoption of more stringent regulations governing 
automotive fuel economy as a means of reducing GHG emis-
sions from new cars and trucks. Because Section 202 provides 
that the EPA "shall" promulgate regulations limiting emissions 
of regulated pollutants from new cars and trucks once an en-
dangerment finding is made, this regulation was inevitable. On 
April 1, 2010, the EPA and the National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration (NHTSA) promulgated regulations requiring 
automal<ers to improve the fuel economy and reduce GHG 
emissions from light-duty vehicles (that is, cars and light 
tmcks).36 These mles effectively require automakers to produce 
vehicles with an average fuel efficiency of 34.1 miles per gallon 
by 2016.37 According to EPA and NHTSA estimates, this will re-
duce by 2030 light-duty vehicle GHG emissions by approxi-
mately 21% compared to a business-as-usual scenario.38 These 
regulations could increase new vehicle prices by $1,000, by the 
EPA's own estimates, 39 though this cost could be offset by in-
35. 42 U.S. C. § 7602(h) (2006) ("All language referring to effects on welfare in-
cludes, but is not limited to, effects on soils, water, crops, vegetation, manmade 
materials, animals, wildlife, weather, visibility, and climate, damage to and 
deterioration of property, and hazards to transportation, as well as effects on 
economic values and on personal comfort and well-being, whether caused by 
transformation, conversion, or combination with other air pollutants."). 
36. Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate 
Average Fuel Economy Standards; Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 25,324 (May 7, 2010). 
37. Id. at 25,330. 
38. Id. at 25,328. 
39. Id. 
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creased fuel savings. These increased costs also could spur vehi-
cle downsizing, resulting in a negative impact on overall auto 
safety.40 These rules will be followed with additional regulations 
governing larger motor vehicles. In November 2010, the EPA 
and NHTSA proposed regulations to increase fuel economy and 
reduce GHG emissions from medium- and heavy-duty vehicles, 
including larger trucks, vans, buses, and tractors.41 
The new fuel economy rules are only the first of several regu-
latory measures set in motion by the endangerment finding. 
Although the EPA made its finding under Section 202, other 
provisions of the Act have virtually identical endangerment 
language. Section 111, for example, governs emissions for 
newly built or modified industrial facilities and likewise re-
quires the Agency to set standards for stationary sources of 
emissions that cause or conhi.bute to "air pollution which may 
reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or wel-
fare."42 If greenhouse gases satisfy the requirements of Section 
202, they surely satisfy Section 111 as well. 
Section 111 requires that the EPA impose emission control 
requirements-"new source performance standards" or 
NSPS-for those categories of stationary sources that contrib-
ute "significantly" to the air pollution at issue.43 If the EPA de-
termines that a given category of sources, such as coal-fired 
steam turbines,44 cement kilns,45 copper smelters,46 or pulp 
40. For a discussion of the potential safety consequences of automotive fuel 
economy regulations, see Robert W. Crandall & John D. Graham, The Effect of 
Fuel Economy Standards on Automobile Safety, 32 J.L. & ECON. 97 (1989). 
41. Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards and Fuel Efficiency Standards for 
Medium- and Heavy-Duty Engines and Vehicles, 75 Fed. Reg. 74,152 (Nov. 30, 
2010). The regulation covers on-road vehicles with a gross vehicle weight of 
8,500 pounds or more, excluding trailers. Id. at 74,153. 
42. 42 U.S.C. § 741l(b)(l)(A) (2006) (requiring the Agency to set emission per-
formance standards for stationary sources that "cause[] or contribute[] signifi-
cantly to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public 
health or welfare"). 
43. Id. § 741l(f). It should be noted that this section only applies if there is no 
National Ambient Air Quality Standard for the emissions in question. Thus, 
should the EPA classify carbon dioxide or other GHGs as criteria air pollutants, 
as discussed below, infra notes 96-103 and accompanying text, then these provi-
sions would not be in force. 
44. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 60.40a-.46 (2009) (standards of performance for fossil-fuel 
fired steam generators for which construction is commenced after August 17, 1971). 
45. See id. §§ 60.60-.66 (standards of performance for Portland cement plants). 
46. See id. §§ 60.160-.166 (standards of performance for copper smelters). 
l 
I 
I 
' I ! ( } 
\ 
No. 21 
mills,"7' 
in the a 
forman 
for red 
into ace 
musth 
vantca 
propri< 
EPA h 
catego1 
In ac 
subjecl 
Sectim 
creatic 
been I 
emissi 
sets fc 
to an~ 
eratio 
isting 
47. ~ 
48. 5 
"a sta: 
limital 
tion v. 
qualit 
tor de 
49. 
nnew 
tiona 
publi 
secti< 
ad de 
life < 
NSP 
50 
51 
the 1 
Port 
ing 
5~ 
5: 
5· 
i!ol. 34 
· vehi-
1 auto 
ations 
~EPA 
y and 
hides, 
regu-
tding. 
other 
rment 
ts for 
se re-
:es of 
t may 
wel-
~ction 
mtrol 
'I 
or 
ntrib-
A de-
-fired 
pulp 
ve fuel 
fleet of 
:ds for 
ov. 30, 
1ght of 
m per-
;ignifi-
public 
e is no 
Thus, 
1tants, 
provi-
sil-fuel 
1971). 
ants). 
No.2] Greenhouse Gases and the Obama Administration 431 
mills,47 contributes "significantly" to the accumulation of GHGs 
in the atmosphere, it is required to establish a "standard of per-
formance" that represents the best-demonstrated technology 
for reducing emissions from that category of sources, taking 
into account the costs of imposing such controls.48 These controls 
must be adopted by new and modified sources witl1in the rele-
vant categories.49 The EPA also is required to "review and, if ap-
propriate, revise" these standards "at least every 8 years."50 The 
EPA has not yet promulgated NSPS for GHGs for any source 
category, but the consideration of such standards is ongoing. 51 
In addition, until GHGs are regulated as criteria air pollutants 
subject to National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS),52 
Section 111 requires the EPA to issue guidelines to states for the 
creation of standards for existing sources for which NSPS have 
been promulgated.53 States are required to establish and impose 
emission standards for existing sources similar to those the EPA 
sets for new and modified sources. In applying these standards 
to any given source, however, the state may "take into consid-
eration, among other factors, the remaining useful life of the ex-
isting source to whidt such standard applies."54 If a state fails to 
47. See id. §§ 60.280-.285 (standards of performance for kraft pulp mills). 
48. See 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(l), (£)(1) (2006) (defining "standard of performance" as 
"a standard for emissions of air pollutants which reflects the degree of emission 
limitation achievable through the application of the best system of emission reduc-
tion which (taking into account the cost of achieving such reduction and any nonair 
quality health and environmental impact and energy requirements) the Administra-
tor determines has been adequately demonstrated"). 
49. See id. § 741l(b)(l). Although this provision, by its terms, only applies to 
"new" sources, Section Ill of the Act defines "new source" to mean "any sta-
tionary source, the construction or modification of which is commenced after the 
publication of regulations ... prescribing a standard of performance under this 
section which will be applicable to such source." ld. § 7411(a)(2) (emphasis 
added). This definition aims to discourage regulated entities from extending the 
life of existing sources through retrofits and other modifications to avoid the 
NSPS requirements for new sources. 
50. See id. § 7411(b)(l)(B). 
51. See, e.g., National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants from 
the Portland Cement Manufacturing Industry and Standards of Performance for 
Portland Cement Plants, 75 Fed. Reg. 54,970, 54,996-97 (Sept. 9, 2010) (discuss-
ing consideration of performance standards for GHGs). 
52. See infra notes 96-103 and accompanying text. 
53. See 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d) (2006). 
54. See id. § 7411(d)(l)(B). 
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adopt an NSPS plan that meets with EPA approval, the Agency 
must impose a regulatory plan of its own. 55 
A more significant effect of the endangerment finding and 
the promulgation of GHG emission controls for new motor ve-
hicles is the triggering of the Clean Air Act's new source re-
view and Title V permitting requirements. Section 165 of the 
Act, implemented through Prevention of Significant Deteriora-
tion (PSD)56 provisions, governs so-called "major" stationary 
sources of air pollution. 57 Under Section 165, companies are re-
quired to adopt emission controls-the "best available control 
technology" (BACT)-for all emissions subject to regulation by 
any part of the Act if they construct or modify any facility that 
qualifies as a "major" stationary source.58 Construction or 
modification of a facility makes it a "new" source for purposes 
of this regulation, which is part of what is commonly referred 
to as "New Source Review." Older facilities are grandfathered 
in, but only so long as they do not make any modifications that 
could increase emissions of regulated pollutants.59 Other re-
lated provisions require major sources to file permits demon-
strating their regulatory compliance. 
The Clean Air Act defines a "major" source for purposes of 
the PSD provisions as a facility that emits or has the potential 
to emit 250 tons per year of a regulated pollutant, or 100 tons 
per year for some specified facilities. 6° For purposes of Title V's 
permitting requirements, "major sources" are those facilities 
that emit or have the potential to emit over 100 tons per year. 61 
For traditional air pollutants, such as sulfur dioxide or nitrogen 
oxides, these thresholds mean that only the biggest and dirtiest 
55. See id. § 74ll(d)(2). 
56. See EPA, Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) Basic Information, 
EP A.Gov, http:/ /www.epa.gov/NSR/psd.html (last updated Nov. 10, 2010). 
57. See 42 U.S.C. § 7475 (2006). 
58. See id. § 7475(a)(4). 
59. This aspect of the New Source Review rules creates a disincentive to modern-
ize and replace older facilities. Insofar as one could expect newer and modified fa-
cilities to be more efficient and to emit less per unit of output, grandfathering can 
create incentives that are cotmterproductive for pollution control. 
60. See id. § 7479(1). 
61. 42 U.S.C. § 7661(2) (2006) adopts the definition provided in id. § 7602(j), defin-
ing a "major" source as "any stationary facility or source of air pollutants which 
directly emits, or has the potential to emit, one hundred tons per year or more of 
any air pollutant." For regulation of hazardous air pollutants, id. § 7661(2) incorpo-
rates the even more stringent definition contained in id. § 7412 (2006). 
I 
i 
I 
! 
~ 
I ~ 
No.2 
facilii 
cilitiE 
ticul< 
quan 
cont1 
by d 
quer 
facili 
man 
A] 
and 
emit 
EPA 
ThE 
reg 
wo 
trol 
tim 
pol 
the 
we 
nu 
we 
251 
tOJ 
1-
l-
n 
n-
ch 
of 
10-
No.2] Greenhouse Gases and the Obama Administration 433 
facilities are subject to federal controls-several thousand fa-
cilities nationwide. This is not the case with GHGs, and par-
ticularly with carbon dioxide, which is emitted in far greater 
quantities than traditional pollutants. Indeed, some efforts to 
control traditional pollutants increase carbon dioxide emissions 
by design, as increased carbon dioxide emissions are a conse-
quence of more complete combustion. Though many industrial 
facilities emit over 250 tons of carbon dioxide per year, so do 
many commercial and residential buildings. 
Applying the Clean Air Act's stationary source regulation 
and permitting provisions to all facilities with the potential to 
emit over 250 tons per year of carbon dioxide would cause the 
EPA's existing program to explode. According to the EPA: 
If PSD and Title V requirements apply at the applicability 
levels provided under the CAA, many small sources 
would be burdened by the costs of individualized PSD 
control technology requirements and permit applications. 
In addition, State permitting authorities would be para-
lyzed by enormous numbers of these permit applications; 
the numbers are orders of magnitude greater than the cur-
rent inventory of permits and would vastly exceed the cur-
rent administrative resources of the permitting authorities.62 
The precise number of facilities that would be subject to these 
regulatory requirements is unclear, but there is no question that it 
would be substantial. In proposing to impose its regulatory con-
trols on GHG emissions, the EPA estimated that a strict applica-
tion of Section 165 would increase the number of required air 
pollution permits "more than 140-fold."63 According to the EPA, 
the number of facilities required to submit PSD applications 
would increase from 280 per year to over 40,000 per year.64 The 
number of facilities subject to Title V permitting requirements 
would increase from approximately 15,000 to about six rnillion.65 
62. Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailor-
ing Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 55,292, 55,294 (Oct. 27, 2009) [hereinafter GHG Tailoring 
Rule] (proposed rule). 
63. Id. at 55,301 (2009). 
64. Id. If anything, this is a conservative estimate, as it is only based upon a 
250-tons-per-year threshold and does not include those facilities subject to a 100 
tons-per-year threshold. 
65. I d. at 55,295. 
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This explosion in regulatory requirements would burden 
both the public and private sectors. Processing just one permit 
for a new or modified industrial source can require over 300 
person-hours for a regulatory agency, and can cost the facility 
seeking the permit several hundred thousand dollars.66 Permit-
ting residential and commercial buildings should be less diffi-
cult, but is still estimated to require approximately sixty 
person-hours per permit.67 As a consequence, the EPA esti-
mates that applying the PSD requirements to GHGs would cost 
regulatory agencies over $250 million per year.68 The costs of 
applying Title V's permitting requirements are even greater. 
Even assuming that most Title V permits can be processed 
quickly and require fewer than forty-five person-hours, the 
"massive influx" of six million permit applications "would 
overwhelm permitting authorities' administrative resources." 69 
According to the EPA, "the total nationwide additional burden 
for permitting authorities for Title V permits from adding GHG 
emissions at the 100-tpy threshold would be 340 million hours, 
which would cost over $15 billion."70 
As incredible as it may seem, the EPA's estimate of the costs 
of applying the Clean Air Act to "major" stationary sources 
may be too conservative. A study commissioned by the U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce estimated that the 250-ton threshold 
would encompass over one million businesses nationwide.71 
Based upon an analysis of sector-specific energy use data from 
the Energy Information Association and the U.S. Census, the 
Chamber of Commerce study concluded that nearly 200,000 
manufacturing facilities, approximately 20,000 farms, and at 
least one million commercial buildings would be covered, in-
cluding a substantial percentage of hospitals, hotels, and large 
restaurants.72 Even 10% of churches and other places of wor-
ship could qualify. The Chamber study reported that on aver-
66. Id. at 55,301. 
67. Id. 
68. Id. 
69. Id. at 55,302. 
70. Id. 
71. See U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, A REGULATORY BURDEN: THE 
COMPLIANCE DIMENSION OF REGULATING C02 AS A POLLUTANT 3 (2008), avail-
able at http://www.uschamber.com/co2. 
72. Id. 
Nc 
ag 
dr 
"c 
la 
re 
N 
ac 
ti-
T 
E 
OJ 
p 
si 
p 
tE 
S< 
a: 
tc 
E 
b 
R 
JL 34 
rden 
2rmit 
r 300 
tcility 
~rmit-
diffi-
sixty 
\. esti-
ld cost 
osts of 
;reater. 
Jcessed 
trs, the 
'would 
trces."69 
burden 
1gGHG 
n hours, 
the costs 
sources 
the U.S. 
hreshold 
Jnwide.71 
lata from 
~nsus, the 
y 200,000 
rs, and at 
'vered, in-
and large 
es of wor-
:t.t on aver-
BURDEN: THE 
3 (2008), avail-
No. 2] Greenhouse Gases and the Obama Administration 435 
age "a building with over 40,000 square feet uses enough hy-
drocarbons to become a regulated source."73 
Because the EPA knows the regulatory nightmare and politi-
cal backlash that enforcing Section 165 could create, the Agency 
has proposed to "tailor" its GHG regulation to limit its applica-
bility. In September 2009, the EPA proposed to set a new thresh-
old of 25,000 tons per year for the imposition of these 
requirements, even though the statute sets an express limit of 
250.74 Under this proposed threshold, the EPA estimates that 
fewer than 15,000 facilities would need to obtain permits for 
their greenhouse gas emissions, most of which are already sub-
ject to New Source Review regulation for other emissions.75 EPA 
Administrator Lisa Jackson explained that the proposal was a 
"common sense rule that is carefully tailored to apply to only the 
largest sources."76 Although a commonsensical approach, the 
regulatory proposal was at odds with the plain text of the act.77 
Nonetheless, Administrator Jackson signaled her willingness to 
adopt an even more elastic reading of the statute if necessary.78 
The EPA justified its elastic reading of the Act on the ground 
that a lower threshold is not feasible for greenhouse gases. 
There is no statutmy text to support this decision, and so the 
EPA relied on the doctrines of "administrative necessity" and 
of avoidance of "absurd results."79 According to the EPA, ap-
plying the Clean Air Act as written to greenhouse gas emis-
sions would "extensively disrupt" existing regulatory 
programs, and perhaps make them "impossible" to adminis-
ter.80 Yet the EPA was not able to identify any case in which 
something as clear as a numerical statutory threshold was cast 
aside because of concerns about implementation. Indeed, it is 
73. Id. at 11. See also Reitze, Federal Control of Greenhouse Gas Emissions, supra 
note 28, at 1302 (summarizing industry estimates of the number of facilities 
subject to PSD for greenhouse gas emissions). 
74. See GHG Tailoring Rule, supra note 62, at 55,292. 
75. Id. at 55,295. 
76. Press Release, EPA, New EPA Rule Will Require Use of Best Technologies 
to Reduce Greenhouse Gases from Large Facilities/Small Businesses and Farms 
Exempt (Sept. 30, 2009). 
77. As the EPA acknowledged in its notice of the proposed rule, "the applica-
bility provisions for PSD and Title V are clear on their face." GHG Tailoring 
Rule, supra note 62, at 55,306. 
78. See generally Letter from Lisa P. Jackson to Jay Rockefeller, supra note 32. 
79. GHG Tailoring Rule, supra note 62, at 55,303-20. 
80. Id. at 55,303-05. 
436 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy [Vol. 34 
common for Congress to enact statutory requirements that 
agencies lack the resources to fulfill and to which courts do not 
afford relief. In this specific case, however, the Clean Air Act's 
text is explicit, and the Supreme Court in Massachusetts v. EPA 
expressly rejected the EPA's claims that applying the Act to 
GHGs would be impossible or unadministrable.81 
The EPA's final tailoring rule backed even further away from 
the express text of the Clean Air Act.82 This rule creates new 
temporary thresholds for the applicability of Section 165 and 
Title V of the Clean Air Act that will change over time. For the 
first six months of 2011, GHG-permitting requirements will 
only apply to those stationary sources already subject to the 
PSD program, and BACT will only be required for those al-
ready-regulated facilities that increase their GHG emissions by 
75,000 tons per year or more.83 From July 2011 through June 
2013, the permitting requirements will be extended to new con-
struction projects that emit 100,000 tons or more of GHGs per 
year and to modifications that increase GHG emissions by 
75,000 tons or more per year.84 At the same time, the EPA an-
nounced that sometime in 2011 it will begin another rulemak-
ing-to be completed in 2012-that will consider whether to 
extend the requirements to those facilities emitting 50,000 tons 
or more of GHGs per year.85 Facilities emitting less than 50,000 
tons per year, however, will not be subject to BACT or Title V 
requirements prior to April30, 2016, at the earliest.86 
According to the EPA, this represents a "common sense" 
approach to imposing regulatory requirements on stationary 
sources. 87 The problem for the EPA is that there is no basis for 
this timetable in the Act, nor does the statute delegate to the 
81. See 549 U.S. 497, 533-34 (2007). 
82. Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailor-
ing Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31,514 (June 3, 2010) (final rule). 
83. Id. at 31,516. 
84. Id. 
85. Id. 
86. Id. 
87. Some would argue there can be no "common sense" approach to climate 
change under the PSD provisions as they only impose controls on new and 
modified sources. Focusing exclusively on such sources makes it "impossible to 
have a least-cost solution" and creates an incentive to keep older, heavier emit-
ting sources online longer. See Craig N. Oren, Is the Clean Air Act at a Cross-
roads?, 40 ENVTL. L. 1231, 1245-46 (2010). 
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EPA the authority necessary to develop such a scheme. The 
EPA maintains that applying the numerical thresholds ex-
pressly provided for in the statute is not feasible for GHGs 
because they are emitted in much higher volumes than tradi-
tionally regulated pollutants. Although the EPA is likely cor-
rect on this point, this does not give it license to rewrite the Act 
or to shift the decimal point on a pollution threshold ever-
rightward until only a politically acceptable number of facili-
ties are subject to regulation. 
Although the EPA's interpretation creates a reprieve for 
thousands of facilities that would otherwise be subject to GHG 
regulation under the Act, its adoption increases the Agency's 
discretionary authority. If it may revise the numerical emission 
thresholds established in the Clean Air Act in response to tem-
porary political or economic concerns, then the Agency is the 
master of its domain and it is the Agency, not Congress, that 
effectively determines the scope of its own authority.88 Thus, 
even while eschewing the imposition of regulatory controls on 
large portions of the economy, the Agency is expanding its au-
thority and loosening the statutory reins imposed by Congress . 
At the same time, the EPA is increasing its authority vis-a-vis 
state agencies over GHG regulation, at least where the Agency 
fears that states will be insufficiently aggressive. Under the 
"cooperative federalism" model embodied in the Clean Air Act 
and most major federal environmental statutes, the PSD and 
Title V regulatory requirements are implemented largely by 
state environmental agencies, subject to EPA oversight. 89 Yet 
the EPA is concerned about state implementation of these pro-
grams as applied to GHG emissions. As a consequence, shortly 
after promulgating the tailoring rule, the EPA put several states 
88. For a lengthy discussion of why courts should not presume Congress has 
delegated agencies discretion to determine the scope of their own jurisdiction, 
and thus should not give Chevron deference where the scope of agency jurisdic-
tion is at issue, see Nathan Alexander Sales & Jonathan H. Adler, The Rest Is 
Silence: Chevron Deference, Agency Jurisdiction, and Statutory Silences, 2009 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 1497, 1532-63. 
89. See Jonathan H. Adler, When Is Two a Crowd? The Impact of Federal Action on 
State Environmental Regulation, 31 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 67,87 (2007) (summariz-
ing the "cooperative federalism" approach to environmental regulation). 
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on notice that they would not have EPA authorization to im-
plement these programs for GHGs. 90 
Regulating GHGs under the applicable source-specific por-
tions of the Act is difficult enough for the EPA as is, but that is 
only one of the EPA's many obligations now that the endanger-
ment finding has been made. In all likelihood, the EPA will also 
need to begin treating carbon dioxide and other GHGs as criteria 
air pollutants, triggering another set of regulatory requirements. 
Under Section 108 of the Act, the EPA Administrator is re-
quired to create a list of criteria air pollutants that includes "each 
air pollutant ... emissions of which, in his judgment, cause or 
contribute to air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated 
to endanger public health or welfare" that is emitted into the 
ambient air by "numerous or diverse mobile or stationary 
sources."91 This endangerment standard is practically indistin-
guishable from that in Section 202. The only potential distinction 
is additional language in Section 108 providing that the pollut-
ant in question must be one for which the EPA Administtator 
"plans to issue air quality criteria under this section."92 There is 
little reason, however, to believe that the EPA could refuse to 
regulate greenhouse gases on this basis. In fact, this argument 
was flatly rejected by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit over thirty years ago in Natural Resources Defense Council 
v. Train. 93 The EPA argued that it could choose not to include 
lead as a criteria air pollutant because it did not plan to issue air 
quality criteria on lead and there were more cost-effective means 
of controlling lead emissions. 94 The Second Circuit found the 
former argument wholly unpersuasive and the latter irrelevant 
given the text of the Act. As the rationale would apply equally to 
carbon dioxide, the EPA's argument must fail unless NRDC v. 
Train is overmled or othetwise legally modified.95 
Under Section 109, once a pollutant is listed the EPA must 
develop a criteria document and establish NAAQS for the pol-
90. Press Release, EPA, EPA Proposes Rules on Clean Air Act Permitting for 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions (Aug. 12, 2010). 
91. 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(1) (2006). 
92. Id. § 7408(a)(1)(C). 
93. 545 F.2d 320, 325-26 (2d Cir. 1976). 
94. Id. at 324. 
95. Some scholars argue that NRDC v. Train was wrongly decided and "is of 
limited authority." See Oren, supra note 87, at 1252-53. 
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lutant. 96 Once the NAAQS is in place, Section 110 requires 
states to submit State Implementation Plans (SIPs) to ensure 
that every metropolitan area in the nation meets the require-
ments.97 Here is where the difficulties would begin, because the 
SIP process was designed for controlling localized, ambient 
pollution problems, not protecting the global atmosphere.98 The 
problem with trying to set a NAAQS for GHGs is that it simply 
makes no sense.99 There is no way for state and local regulators 
to ensure that individual cities, or even larger regions, meet an 
air-quality standard for a globally dispersed atmospheric pol-
lutant. Local emissions could be reduced to zero, and a given 
area would still violate the NAAQS if global emissions had not 
declined. It would be a pointless regulatory exercise. 
The EPA might argue that the NAAQS regulatory regime is 
fundamentally ill-suited to GHG control. The Agency would 
have a point, albeit one rejected by the Massachusetts v. EPA ma-
jority. The meaningful measure of GHG pollution levels is their 
concentration in the global atmosphere, not the locally ambient 
air. There is nothing any given jurisdiction can do to comply 
with a NAAQS for carbon dioxide unless emissions are con-
trolled worldwide. No state could possibly meet a GHG NAAQS 
set in accordance with the Act's requirements. Nonetheless, the 
Massachusetts v. EPA majority explicitly rejected the idea that 
recognizing GHGs as pollutants under the CAA would produce 
any unintuitive or illogical results, 100 so this argument is fore-
closed. At best, state failure to submit acceptable plans would 
eventually lead to tl1.e adoption of a Federal Implementation 
Plan under Section 179,101 after years of litigation.1°2 
96. 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (2006). 
97. Id. § 7410. 
98. See Jonathan B. Wiener, Think Globally, Act Globally: The Limits of Local Cli-
mate Policies, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1961, 1962 (2007). 
99. Indeed, even some environmentalist organizations claim to oppose this 
approach. See Oren, supra note 87, at 1246 ("Then-counsel for the Sierra Club 
has said he would join industry in opposing the use of the ambient standard 
system" for greenhouse gas emission control.). 
100. 549 u.s. 497, 530 (2007). 
101. 42 U.S. C. § 7509. 
102. Jonathan Wiener, Climate Policy After Mass v. EPA, THE FACULTY BLOG 
(Apr. 3, 2007, 2:24PM), http://uchicagolaw.typepad.com/faculty/2007/04/climate 
_policy _.html. 
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The EPA may be in no hurry to develop a GHG NAAQS, but 
environmentalist groups could force the Agency's hand. On De-
cember 2, 2009, for instance, the Center for Biological Diversity 
(CBD) filed a petition with the EPA demandil1.g that the EPA 
adopt a GHG NAAQS.l03 It was a petition of just this sort that set 
the greenhouse regulatory train in motion, and the CBD is more 
than ready to file suit if the EPA does not comply. If successful, 
the CBD will force the EPA to bring the full force of the Clean 
Air Act down on GHG emissions, and the resulting increase in 
regulatory expenditure in time and money will be substantial. 
III. SPREADING REGULATORY HEAT 
Not all of the new regulatory initiatives to address the threat 
of climate change are related to the Clean Air Act. The EPA and 
other federal agencies have also begun to use additional sources 
of regulatory authority to control GHG emissions or otherwise 
address climate change concems.l04 Some states, most notably 
California, have also sought to begin regulatil1.g GHGs, 1os and 
various states and environmentalist organizations still seek to 
use the courts to encourage or induce further regulatory efforts. 
Even beyond the confines of the Clean Air Act, the EPA is 
the primary regulatory agency concerned with climate change. 
Among the Obama Administration's first climate-related regu-
latory initiatives was a mandatory reporting requirement for 
GHG emissions for industrial facilities and other large emission 
sources. In a regulation that became effective on December 29, 
2009, the EPA required reporting by any facility responsible for 
emissions of 25,000 tons per year or more of GHGs, as well as 
by firms in certain specified industries.106 Although the regula-
tion concerns emissions of GHGs il1.to the air, the regulation 
103. Petition from the Center for Biological Diversity to Lisa P. Jackson, 
Adm'r, Environmental Protection Agency, Petition To Establish National Pollu-
tion Limits for Greenhouse Gases Pursuant to the Clean Air Act (Dec. 2, 2009). 
104. See Margaret Kriz Hobson, A Change of Weather, NAT'L J., Dec. 19, 2009, at 
36 (reporting on the Obama Administration's "government-wide strategy of 
acknowledging and attempting to curb global warming"). 
105. See, e.g., Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006 (AB32), CAL. HEALTH & 
SAFETY CODE§§ 38500-38599 (West 2010). 
106. The regulation also requires firm-wide reporting in certain industries, in-
cluding vehicle and engine manufacturers and some fossil fuel suppliers. See 
Mandatory Reporting of Greenhouse Gases, 74 Fed. Reg. 56,260 (Oct. 30, 2009). 
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was not adopted under the Clean Air Act. Rather, the authority 
for the reporting requirement was provided by the FY2008 
Consolidated Appropriations Act,107 signed into law by Presi-
dent George W. Bush in December 2007.108 
Although one might not think of climate change as a water pol-
lution problem, this might not stop climate-related regulation un-
der the Clean Water Act.1D9 In December 2007, the CBD petitioned 
the EPA to revise federal water quality criteria for marine pH lev-
els in response to ocean acidification that could be caused by in-
creased atmospheric levels of carbon dioxide. Tite EPA agreed to 
respond to this petition in January 2009.110 The Obama Admini-
stration subsequently settled a related lawsuit and issued a 
memorandum calling upon states to take ocean acidification into 
account in state water quality programs.111 Specifically, the EPA 
determined that states should identify those coastal waters im-
paired by ocean acidification, a step that could lead to more strin-
gent pollution control requirements under other portions of the 
Clean Water Act and delegated state programs.112 
TI1e EPA also moved to give states more leeway to regulate 
GHG emissions, at least so long as states seek to be more stringent 
than the federal government. In December 2005, the California Air 
Resources Board (CARB) applied to the EPA for a waiver of pre-
emption under the Clean Air Act for regulations that CARB 
sought to impose on motor vehicle GHG emissions.113 During the 
Bush Administration, the EPA denied California's request, citing 
a preference for nationally applicable regulation of motor vehicle 
107. See H.R. 2764, Pub. L No. 110-161, 121 Stat. 1844, 2128 (2007). 
108. See Mandatory Reporting of Greenhouse Gases, 74 Fed. Reg. 56,260, 
56,264 (Oct. 30, 2009). 
109. See Robin Kundis Craig, Climate Change Comes to the Clean Water Act: Now 
What?, 1 WASH & LEE}. ENERGY, CLIMATE & ENV'T 9 (2010). 
110. See Letter from Benjamin H. Grumbles, Asst. Adm'r, EPA, to Ms. Miyoko Saka-
shita, Ctr. for Biological Diversity (Jan. 16, 2009), http://www.biologicaldiversity.org/ 
campaigns/ocean_acidilication/pdfs/EPA_Response_to_CBD_Ocean_Acidilication_ 
Petition. pdf. 
111. Memorandum from Denise Keehner, Director, Office of Wetlands, 
Oceans and Watersheds, EPA, to the Water Division Directors, Regions 1-10, 
Integrated Reporting and Listing Decisions Related to Ocean Acidification 
(Nov. 15, 2010). . 
112. See, e.g., Craig, supra note 109, at 30 (discussing how impairment due to 
ocean acidification could result in more stringent National Pollutant Discharge 
Elimination System (NPDES) permit requirements). 
113. See Letter from Cal. Air. Res. Bd. to Stephen L. Johnson, Adm'r, EPA 
(Dec. 21, 2005). 
442 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy [Vol. 34 
emissions.114 Immediately upon taking office, President Obama 
instructed the EPA to reconsider its prior decision. 115 TI1e waiver 
was formally granted six months later, authorizing California, 
and other states by extension, to adopt more stringent motor ve-
hicle GHG controls than the federal govemment.1I6 
Although the EPA is responsible for most climate change re-
lated federal regulatory initiatives, it is not alone. Under the 
Obama Administration a number of other agencies have begun to 
implement measures to address GHG emissions.117 For example, 
in October 2009, President Obama issued Executive Order 13514 
requiring all federal agencies to reduce their GHG emissions and 
improve their environmental performance.l18 Among other 
things, this order required all federal agencies to set a GHG emis-
sion reduction target for 2020, to reduce vehicle fleet petroleum 
use by 30% by 2020, and implement a "net-zero-energy" building 
requirement by 2030.I19 President Obama also directed the De-
partment of Energy to set more stringent energy efficiency stan-
dards for appliances, including both commercial equipment and 
residential products, under the Energy Policy Act of 2005.12° 
The Council on Environmental Quality is another culprit, hav-
ing promulgated draft guidance on the "Consideration of the Ef-
. fects of Climate Change and Greenhouse Gas Emissions" under 
the National Environmental Policy Act (NEP A).l21 This guidance 
outlines how federal agencies must evaluate and consider the po-
114. See Letter from Stephen L. Johnson, Adm'r, EPA, to Arnold Schwarzenegger, 
Governor, Cal. (Dec. 19, 2007), http://www.epa.gov/otaq/climate/20071219-slj.pdf. For 
a discussion of the legal and policy issues surrounding California's waiver request, see 
generally Jonathan H. Adler, Hothouse Flowers: The Vices and VirhLes of Climate Federal-
ism, 17 TEMP. POL. & Crv. RTS. L. REV. 443 (2008). 
115. See John M. Broder & Peter Baker, Obama's Order Likely to Tighten Auto 
Standards, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2009, at Al. 
116. Press Release, EPA, EPA Grants California GHG Waiver Oune 30, 2009), 
http:/ /yosernite.epa.gov I opal admpress.nsf/bd 43 79a92ceceeac8525735900400c27 I 
5e448236de5fb369852575e500568e1b!OpenDocument. For a fuller discussion of 
the legal and policy issues raised by California's request for a waiver of pre-
emption, see Adler, supra note 114, at 453-62. 
117. See generally U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 5, at 39-75. 
118. Exec. Order No. 13,514, 74 Fed. Reg. 52,117 (Oct. 8, 2009). 
119. Id. at 52,117-19. 
120. Memorandum from Barack Obama, President, to the Sec'y of Energy, Appli-
ance Efficiency Standards (Feb. 5, 2009), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/ 
ApplianceEfficiencyStandards/. 
121. 75 Fed. Reg. 8,046 (Feb. 23, 2010). 
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tential climate change impacts and resulting GHG emissions of 
significant federal actions subject to regulation under NEP A.122 
The Interior Department launched a "coordinated strategy" 
to address the impact of climate change on lands and waters 
managed by agencies within the Department.123 Secretarial Or-
der No. 3289 created, among other things, a "Climate Change 
Response Council" that will require each bureau and office 
within the Department to incorporate climate change concerns 
into Agency management plans and decision-making, includ-
ing "major decisions regarding potential use of resources under 
the Department's purview ."124 In addition, Secretarial Order 
No. 3285 ."prioritized development of renewable energy on 
public lands and offshore waters to reduce our dependence on 
foreign oil and to reduce greenhouse gas pollution."125 The In-
terior Department is responsible for managing approximately 
20% of the nation's land, in addition to large portions of the 
Outer Continental Shel£.126 The Forest Service is also consider-
ing how climate change concems should alter its management 
of national forests. 127 
The Fish and Wildlife Service designated 187,000 square miles 
of u on-shore barrier islands, denning areas and offshore sea-ice" 
as critical habitat for polar bears, which are listed as a threatened 
species.128 The Endangered Species Act requires federal agencies 
to consult with the Service when undertaking, funding, or permit-
ting actions that could adversely critical habitat.l29 
Finally, the SEC decided by a three-to-two vote to issue an in-
terpretive guidance for public companies on how the SEC's dis-
122. Id. 
123. See Secretarial Order No. 3,289, Addressing the Impacts of Climate 
Change on America's Water, Land, and Other Natural and Cultural Resources 
(Dep't of the Interior Sept. 14, 2009) [hereinafter Order No. 3,289]. 
124. I d. at 2-3. 
125. See id. at 3; see also Secretarial Order No. 3285, Renewable Energy Devel-
opment by the Department of the Interior (Dep't of the Interior Mar. 11, 2009). 
126. See Juliet Eilperin, Interior Launches Climate Strategy, WASH. POST, Sept. 15, 
2009, at A3 ("Interior manages one-fifth of the nation's land mass and nearly 1.7 
billion acres on the Outer Continental Shelf."). 
127. See Hobson, supra note 104, at 37. 
128. Press Release, Dep't of the Interior, U.S. Fish and Wildlife S~rvice An-
nounces Final Designation of Polar Bear Critical Habitat (Nov. 24, 2010), 
http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/US-Fish-and-Wildlife-Service-
Announces-Final-Designation-of-Polar-Bear-Critical-Habitat.cfm. 
129. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2006). 
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closure requirements apply to economic and legal risks relating to 
climate cl1.ange. The SEC concluded that public companies may 
have an obligation to disclose risks associated with proposed cli-
mate change legislation, regulation, and international agreements, 
the indirect economic consequences of such regulation, and po-
tentially material impacts of climate change on their business.130 
These measures, in addition to the regulatory mandates un-
derway at the EPA, represent a dramatic assertion of federal 
regulatory authority to address the threat of climate change. 
The Administration is utilizing in this effort virtually every 
policy lever it can reach. The question, though, is whether all of 
this federal regulatory activity will make a meaningful differ-
ence in addressing the threat of climate change. 
IV. THE FUTILITY OF FEDERAL REGULATION 
Federal efforts to control GHG emissions may be in full gear, 
but they are far from sufficient to meet the Administration's 
stated "80 by 50" goal and will do little to reduce the risks of 
global climate change. Existing environmental statutes were not 
designed to control GHG emissions and are not well-suited to 
achieve state climate policy goals. More stringent regulatory 
measures are not the answer either. Even dramatic near-to-
medium tenn reductions in GHG emissions from the United 
States will fail to reduce the buildup of GHGs in the atmosphere. 
Unless atmospheric concentrations are controlled, global warm-
ing will continue apace. 
Regulation of GHG emissions under the Clean Air Act, as dis-
cussed above, will impose a wide range of regulatory burdens 
throughout the economy, but is unlikely to come anywhere close 
to the aspirational goal of reducing emissions 80% by 2050. This is 
made clear when one looks at the projected or likely emissions 
reductions from various regulatory measures, none of which 
come close to acluevin.g 80% reductions for covered facilities or 
teclmologies. New regulations on light-duty motor vehicles are 
expected to reduce automotive GHG emissions by 21% by 2030-
130. Corrunission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate Change, Se- . 
curities Act Release No. 9106, Exchange Act Release No. 61,649, 75 Fed. Reg. 6,290 
(Feb. 8, 2010). 
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only 25% of the needed reduction in the first twenty years.131 Ap-
plication of NSPS to coal-fired power plants could produce up to 
10% GHG emission reductions from those sources, according to 
one recent analysisP2 As coal-fired power plants are responsible 
for nearly one-third of GHG emissions in the United States, this 
would represent a 3% reduction in aggregate GHG emissions133 -
a tiny portion of the proposed 80% reduction of the Obama Ad-
ministration. Other analyses suggest that this estimate is overly 
optimistic, and that NSPS is unlikely to reduce GHG emissions by 
more than 5% from existing facilities.134 If the 80 by 50 goal is to be 
achieved, insufficient emission reductions in one sector will need 
to be made up elsewhere. Yet there does not appear to be any sec-
tor subject to EPA regulation capable of achieving emission reduc-
tions in excess of the 80 by 50 target. 
The House-passed climate legislation endorsed by the 
Obama Administration would have substantially expanded 
federal regulation even further, without solving the climate 
policy challenge. By one estimate, it would have required 
nearly 150 federal agency rulemakings.135 Another analysis of 
the bill concluded that it required the EPA's Administrator "to 
perform over 600 tasks in connection with the operation of the 
law," and created responsibilities for eleven more federal agen-
cies and departments, in addition to "multiple planning and 
reporting mandates for state govenLments."136 Despite all this 
regulatory effort, however, the bill would not have achieved its 
stated goal of reducing GHG emissions by 80%,137 let alone 
have stemmed anthropogenic global warming. 
131. See Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corpo-
rate Average Fuel Economy Standards; Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 25,324, 25,328 
(May 7, 2010). 
132. See NATHAN RICHARDSON ET AL., GREENHOUSE GAS REGULATION UNDER THE 
CLEAN A1R Acr: STRUO'URE, EFFEO'S, AND IMPUCATIONS OF A KNOWABLE PATHWAY 
36 (2010), avaz1able at www.rff.org/documents/RFF-DP-10-23.pdf. 
133. I d. at 35, 44. 
134. See Franz T. Litz & Nicholas M. Bianco, What to Expect from EPA: Regula-
tion of Greenlwuse Gas Emissions Under the Clean Air Act, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. 10480, 
10482 tbl.II (2010). 
135. See E. Donald Elliott, Lessons from Implementing the 1990 CAA Amendments, 
40 ENVTL. L. REP. 10592 (2010). 
136. See Steven F. Hayward & Kenneth P. Green, Waxman-Markey: An Exercise 
in Unreality, AEI ENERGY & ENV'T OUTLOOK 2, July 2009, at 2. 
137. See id.; Jesse Jenkins, Analysis of Waxman-Markey ACES Climate Bill: Full Break-
through Institute Collection, BREAK1HROUGH BLOG Gune 26, 2009, 12:15 AM), 
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The unforhmate reality is that the 80 by 50 target is unrealistic 
given existing and projected technologies. Reducing emissions by 
80% below 2005 levels requires reducing emissions to their lowest 
point in a century.I38 Specifically, it means reducing emissions to 
the approximate level of 1910, when the nation's population 
was only ninety-two million people and per capita income was 
below $6,200.139 By 2050, however, the population of the United 
States is expected to exceed 400 million, meaning that per cap-
ita emissions would need to be more than 75% below their 1910 
level-somewhere in the neighborhood of 2.4 tons of carbon-
dioxide-equivalent per year-or to levels not seen since the end 
of Reconstruction. 140 Even nations that derive much of their 
electricity from carbon-free sources, such as nuclear power, 
come nowhere close to this level.l41 2.4 tons per year is slightly 
less than the per capita GHG emissions of nations such as Gre-
nada and Botswana.l42 
Even if the 80 by 50 goal were readily achievable through 
regulatory impositions, it would still be insufficient to stem 
the accumulation of GHGs in the atmosphere. The goal of at-
mospheric stabilization requires global action. Emissions from 
all around the globe contribute to the buildup of GHGs in the 
atmosphere, and it is the global atmospheric concentration of 
GHGs that drives climate change. Emissions in the United 
States could fall to zero and the climate problem would still not 
be solved if emissions continue to increase elsewhere. Indeed, 
even if all Western developed nations eliminated all net GHG 
http://thebreakthrough.org/blog/2009/06/aces_analysis_full_breakthroug.shhnl. In 
most existing cap-and-trade programs credits "are heavily over-allocated and allow 
excessive banking of credits, undermining their effectiveness in achieving 
meaningful emission reductions." Teresa B. Clemmer, Staving Off the Climate 
Crisis: The Sectoral Appraoch Under the Clean Air Act, 40 ENVTL. L. 1125, 1137-38 
(2010); see also Lesley K. McAllister, The Overallocation Problem in Cap-and-Trade: 
Moving Toward Stringency, 34 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 395 (2009). 
138. See Hayward & Green, supra note 136, at 3. 
139. Id. (per capita income in 2008 dollars). Hayward and Green's calculations 
are based upon Department of Energy data. 
140. Id. 
141. France generates approximately 80% of its electricity with nuclear power, 
has much higher population density than the United States, and still has per 
capita emissions of over 6.5 tons per year. Id. at 3-4. 
142. Id. at 4. 
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emissions tomorrow, atmospheric concentrations would con-
tinue to climb for decades.143 
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, agreed to in 1992, established the goal of stabilizing at-
mospheric concenh·ations of greenhouse gases at a level that 
avoids "dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate 
system."144 Although this level is not defined anywhere, it is ac-
cepted generally that the framework required stabilizing atmos-
pheric concenh·ations to a level between 450 and 550 parts per 
million (ppm), if not lower, so as to avoid an average global 
temperature increase of two degrees Celsius.145 Meeting such a 
goal would require more than marginal reductions in emissions 
from existing technologies. It would require truly revolutionary 
technological changes.146 Simply allowing existing infrastructure 
to remain in place, even while stopping all additional develop-
143. See lNT'L ENERGY AGENCY, WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK 2008, at 48 (2008) 
(showing atmospheric GHG concentrations would still rise above 450ppm by 
mid-century even if OECD member nation emissions are excluded). 
144. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 2, May 9, 
1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107. 
145. See, e.g., S. Pacala & R. Socolow, Stabilization Wedges: Solving the Current 
Climate Problem for the Next 50 Years with Current Technologies, 305 SCI. 968, 968 
(2004) ("Proposals to limit atmospheric C02 to a concentration that would pre-
vent most damaging climate change have focused on a goal of 500 +/- 50 parts 
per million (ppm), or less than double the preindustrial concentration of 280 
ppm."). Some environmentalist organizations advocate a significantly lower 
target of 350 ppm, which would require even more ambitious measures. See 
Andrew C. Revkin, Campaign Against Emissions Picks Number, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
24, 2009, at AS. See generally 350.0RG, http://www.350.org. 
146. See, e.g., John Alic et al., Opinion, A New Strategy for Energy Innovation, 
466 NATURE 316, 316 (2010) ("Limiting the concentration of carbon dioxide and 
other greenhouse gases in Earth's atmosphere requires a technological and eco-
nomic revolution."); Scott Barrett, The Coming Global Climate-Tec/mology Revolu-
tion, 23 J. ECON. PERSP. 53, 53 (2009) (arguing that "stabilizing concentrations 
will require a technological revolution-a 'revolution' because it will require 
fundamental change, achieved within a relatively short period of time"); Martin 
I. Hoffert et al., Advanced Technology Paths to Global Climate Stability: EnergJJ for a 
Greenhouse Planet, 298 SCI. 981, 981 (2002) ("Arguably, the most effective way to 
reduce C02 emissions with economic growth and equity is to develop revolu-
tionary changes in the technology of energy production, distribution, storage, 
and conversion."). The cl1.allenge could be even greater than generally assumed, 
as it is possible that conventional estimates already incorporate unrealistic as-
sumptions about the rate of emission-reducing technological change in busi-
ness-as-usual scenarios. See Roger Pielke Jr., Tom Wigley & Christopher Green, 
Dangerous Assumptions, 452 NATURE 531, 531 (2008). 
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ment, would be enough by itself to approach the 450 ppm lower 
bound.147 And stopping global development is not an option. 
GHG emissions have continued to increase with economic 
growth, despite gains in energy efficiency. For example, global 
emissions of carbon dioxide from fuel combustion increased 
38% between 1990 and 2007.148 Emissions in developing nations 
are climbing particularly rapidly in conjunction with much-
needed economic development. In 2008, nearly 1.5 billion peo-
ple around the world lacked access to electricity, including 809 
million in Asia.149 For affected nations, electrification is under-
standably a greater priority than emissions reduction. India 
and China, the first and fourth leading emitters of GHG, are 
essential to any atmospheric stabilization plan and yet have 
made clear that they will not participate in any regime that 
would require them to forego future economic growth.150 
Because the atmosphere is a global commons, no country has 
much incentive to reduce its own emissions without the assur-
ance that other nations will follow suit.151 Worse, those coun-
tries most essential to the control of global emissions-the 
United States and China in particular-have the least incentive 
to act.l52 Although some cmmtries may be willing to enact envi-
ronmental policies for the benefit of other nations because it is 
the "right thing" to do, the more expensive such measures are 
147. See Stephen J. Davis, Ken Caldeira & H. Damon Matthews, Future C02 
Emissions and Climate Change from Existing Energtj Infrastructure, 329 Scr. 1330, 
1330 (2010). 
148. See INT'L ENERGY AGENCY, C02 EMISSIONS FROM FUEL COMBUSTION: 
HIGHLIGHTS 44 (2010), available at http://www.iea.org/co2highlights/ 
C02highlights. pdf. 
149. See Access to Electricity, IEA.ORG, http://www.iea.org/weo/electricity.asp 
(last visited Mar. 12, 2011). 
150. According to Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, "[d]eveloping countries 
cannot and will not compromise on development." See L. Barber, Transcript: Wen Jia-_ 
baa, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2009, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/795d2bca-f0fe-lldd-8790-
0000779fd2ac.html ("[I]t's difficult for China to take quantified emission reduction 
quotas at the Copenhagen conference, because this country is still at an early stage of 
development."); Ravi Nessman, India: Climate Deal Can't Sacrifice Poor Nations, 
GUARDIAN (UK), Oct. 22, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/feedarticle/8767757; 
see also Robert W. Halm, Climate Polictj: Separating Fact from Fantasy, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. 
REV. 557, 564 (2009) (arguing that "there is no simple way to get major developing 
countries, sudt as India and Ollila, to participate in an agreement"). 
151. See generally Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 So. 1243 (1968). 
152. See Cass R. Sunstein, The World vs. the United States and China? The Com-
plex Climate Change Incentives of the Leading Greenhouse Gas Emitters, 55 UCLA L. 
REV. 1675, 1676-77 (2008). 
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likely to be, the less likely it is that any individual nation will 
take such autonomous action. Even assuming a degree of non-
self-interested behavior in international affairs, there is a limit 
to how great a cost individual nations will bear for the benefits 
of other nations or the world at large.153 
If planet-wide GHG emission reductions are to be achieved, the 
cost of emission reductions will have to decline dramatically. 
Western developed nations have shown themselves unwilling to 
implement costly emission control policies, and developing na-
tions are even more resistant to sacrificing economic growth to 
forestall projected climate changes. The international phase-out of 
chlorofluorocarbons under the Montreal Protocol was not agreed 
to until after it became economical to do so.154 Climate change is a 
far more difficult, and more costly, problem. The reality is that 
"when policies focused on economic growth confront policies fo-
cused on emissions reductions, it is economic growth that will 
win out every time."155 Unless and until it becomes easier-and 
far less costly-to meet the world's economic and development 
needs while controlling GHG emissions, meaningful emission 
reductions will not happen. 
V. PLOTIING AN ALTERNATIVE COURSE 
Reducing net emissions so as to reduce atmospheric GHG con-
centrations, while maintaining economic growth and expanding 
access to energy for those in developing nations, carmot be 
achieved with existing or readily foreseeable technologies.156 Ac-
cording to a recent report of the National Academy of Sciences, 
atmospheric stabilization "will require scientific and engineering 
genius to create new energy systems that avoid emitting all but a 
153. See Hahn, supra note 150, at 576 ("[D]omestic energy politics will constrain 
the approacl1es that particular countries will take to reducing emissions."). 
154. See Cass R. Sunstein, Of Montreal and Kyoto: A Tale of Two Protocols, 31 
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 5 (2007). 
155. PJELKE, supra note 10, at 46. 
156. See Jason Scott Johnson, A Looming Policy Disaster, REG., Fall 2008, at 40 
("[R]eally large reductions in greenhouse gas emissions depend upon the wide-
spread adoption of new teclmologies that are either not yet teclmologically and 
economically feasible-most prominently carbon capture and sequestration -or 
whose large-scale implementation possibilities are seemingly inherently limited 
and are at best unclear .... "). 
450 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy [Vol. 34 
small fraction of today' s GHGs while simultaneously powering 
global economic growth."Is7 
Centralized federal regulation is a poor match for the climate 
policy challenge. Regulatory requirements may work tolerably 
well at mandating the diffusion and adoption of viable tech-
nologies, but command-and-control regulation has a poor re-
cord of driving technological advancement in a desired 
direction, particularly where revolutionary innovations are re-
quired.158 Market-based regulatory systems, including cap-and-
trade systems, have not fared much better. The Clean Air Act's 
acid rain program may well have reduced the cost of reducing 
sulfur dioxide emissions through the use of a tradable permit 
mechanism, but the program did not significantly drive techno-
logical innovation.159 The program's emissions reduction tar-
gets were "well within the range of capabilities of existing 
technology," an_d thus did more to encourage diffusion of pol-
lution control innovations that were already available.I60 
If the United States and other nations are to have any hope of 
stabilizing atmospheric concentrations of GHGs at a desirable 
level, dramatic tedmological innovation is required. Therefore, 
climate policy efforts should focus, first and foremost, on spur-
ring and facilitating precisely that type of innovation. Such regu-
latory mandates being pursued by the EPA under the Clean Air 
Act divert limited public and private resources and emphasize 
measures that provide few climate mitigation benefits. 
A climate policy focused on technological innovation would 
eschew regulatory mandates while creating incentives for in-
novation and accelerating the diffusion of low-carbon tech-
157. NAT'L ACAD. OF SCI., LIMITING THE FUTURE MAGNITUDE OF CLIMATE 
CHANGE, at ix (2010). See also Hoffert et al., supra note 146, at 981 ("Arguably, 
the most effective way to reduce C02 emissions with economic growth and eq-
uity is to develop revolutionary changes in the technology of energy produc-
tion, distribution, storage, and conversion."). 
158. See Jonathan H. Adler, Eyes on a Climate Prize: Rewarding Energy Innova-
tion to Achieve Climate Stabilization, 35 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 35-42 (2011). 
159. See David M. Driesen, An Environmental Competition Statute, in BEYOND 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: POLICY PROPOSALS FOR A BETTER ENVIRONMENTAL 
FUTURE 175-76 (Alyson C. Flournoy & David M. Driesen eds., 2010). 
160. Lee Lane, The Green Movement and the Challenge of Climate Change, AEI ENERGY 
AND ENV'T OUTLOOK, Feb. 2009, at 3; Anne E. Smith, Jeremy Platt & A. Denny Eller-
man, The Costs of Reducing Utility S02 Emissions-Not as Low as You Might Think (Ctr. 
for Energy and Envtl. Policy Research, Working Paper No. 98010, 1998). 
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nologies. Such a policy agenda might include some of the fol-
lowing elements: 
• Technology-Inducement Prizes: A more promising means 
of encouraging technological innovation than tradi-
tional ex ante R&D grants is the endowment of large fi-
nancial prizes for those who develop technologies 
capable of meeting identifiable climate-related needs, 
such as more powerful battery and power storage tech-
nologies, more efficient and reliable forms of renewable 
energy, more energy efficient infrastructure, and less 
costly carbon sequestration technologies.161 
• Reducing Barriers to Alternative Energy Sources: New 
technologies often face sizable regulatory hurdles. 
This is as true with renewable energy sources as it has 
been with nuclear power. Proposed development of 
off-shore wind farms, tidal power, and other low- or 
zero-carbon energy sources have been delayed and 
made more costly by various regulatory require-
ments. If such teclmologies are to be adopted, regula-
tory barriers to their adoption must be reduced. 
• Encouraging Diffusion Through Procurement: Federal 
procurement provides the federal government with 
substantial power to drive the development and dif-
fusion of technologies in the markets for various 
goods and services. The federal government should 
develop procurement guidelines that provide sub-
stantial incentive for the development and marketing 
of low-carbon technologies and services. 
• Shifting the Tax Burden from Labor and Wealth Creation to 
Carbon: A sure way to increase the incentive to reduce 
the use of carbon-based fuels, increase energy efficiency, 
and provide incentives on the margin for the develop-
ment and adoption of climate-friendly technologies is to 
place a price on carbon. The easiest way to do this 
would be to replace existing taxes on labor and wealth 
creation, including some payroll, income and corporate 
taxes, with taxes on the carbon content of fuels.I62 
161. The value of technology inducement prizes in climate policy is discussed 
at length in Adler, supra note 158. 
162. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & David M. Uhlmann, Combating Global Climate 
Change: Why a Carbon Tax Is a Better Response to Global Warming than Cap and 
452 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy [Vol. 34 
This is not an exhaustive list of potential policy measures, but 
these proposals are representative of things policymakers 
could do to emphasize and accelerate the development and dif-
fusion of climate-friendly technologies to make atmospheric 
stabilization an economically and practically viable alternative. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Global climate change may be the most difficult environ-
mental challenge humanity has ever faced. Addressing con-
cerns about global warming without unnecessarily curtailing 
individual liberty and economic growth is an even greater chal-
lenge. Because carbon dioxide and other GHGs are so ubiqui-
tous, it is difficult for governments to control GHG emissions 
without controlling large portions of the economy and sup-
pressing future economic growth. 
The Obama Administration has moved aggressively to curtail 
GHG emissions. These efforts are likely to impose substantial 
costs and expand federal regulatory power, but are unlikely sig-
nificantly to mitigate, let alone to prevent, global climate change. 
Even substantial emission reductions will not alter tl1e climate's 
trajectory to any meaningful degree, and those measures capable 
of stabilizing the atmosphere today are untl1inkable in a liberal 
society. If the tl1reat of global climate change is to be addressed 
at an acceptable cost to economic liberty and human prosperity, 
policymakers must chart a new course that emphasizes techno-
logical innovation and provides incentives to adopt low-carbon 
technologies as they become available. Only this approach has 
the hope of keeping us free and cool. 
Trade, 28 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3 (2009); Michael J. Waggoner, The House Erred: A 
Carbon Tax Is Better than Cap and Trade, TAX NOTES, Sept. 21,2009. 
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